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Introduction
The imposition of apartheid policies in South Africa after 1948, and the use of the military to defend white minority rule against internal and external threats contributed to the increasing militarisation of all aspects of South African society. This process of militarisation, which started in the 1960s and then gathered momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, was reflected in increasing levels of military spending, and the establishment of a domestic arms industry. Since 1989 the two main sources of conflict in Southern Africa -the Cold War and apartheid -have disappeared. South Africa's transition to democracy, which started in 1989, and culminated with the holding of the country's first democratic elections in April 1994, was accompanied by a process of demilitarisation, which included dramatic cuts in military spending, the downsizing of the South African Defence Force (SADF), and the reestablishment of civil control over the armed forces. Between 1989 and 1996 South Africa's defence budget was cut by more than 50% in real terms, with most of the cuts coming from the procurement budget which was cut by more than 80% in real terms. Despite the cuts, South Africa remains the continent's largest military spender in absolute terms, and in 1995 accounted for more than 70% of total military spending in Southern Africa.
In this context it is important to understand the likely economic effects of such cuts and an important starting point is to develop an understanding of the economic role played by military spending in the country. This paper makes a contribution to this task by undertaking an econometric analysis of the defence growth relation within the context of an established neoclassical model. The degree of change that has taken place in South Africa makes it a particularly interesting case study to add to the literature. To this end Section 2 provides some general economic background and context on the South African economy, with Section 3 considering the trends in military spending in South Africa since 1961. Section 4 then develops the neoclassical model too be used and estimates it on aggregate macroeconomic data. Section 5 then considers the impact on the manufacturing sector in South Africa using the same approach. Finally, Section 6 presents some conclusions.
The South African Economy
South Africa is Africa's largest and most sophisticated economy. The country is richly endowed with national resources, and the economy was built up on the basis of mining and agriculture. However, in recent years, the secondary (i.e. manufacturing) and tertiary (e.g. transport, financial services) sectors have come to dominate the economy.
The South African economy experienced its longest and most severe recession -since the depression of the 1930s-between 1989 and 1993. During this period GDP growth averaged less than 1% per annum in real terms, while GNP per capita declined every year in real terms. Total employment in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy declined by an average of 1% between 1989 and 1993 while Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI) declined by an average of more than 2% per annum. Inflation remained stubbornly high during this period, averaging 13.6% per annum. Exports also showed little positive growth during this period, largely because of the continued presence of trade and financial sanctions (see Table 1 ). Since 1993, however, the South African economy has experienced positive GDP growth for four consecutive years. GDP growth averaged 2.6% between 1993 and 1996 while GNP per capita also witnessed positive growth, averaging 1% per annum. Gross Domestic Fixed Investment recovered quite dramatically and experienced average growth of nearly 6% per annum between 1993 and 1996. Exports also experienced positive growth, largely as a result of the lifting of trade sanctions, which accompanied the ending of apartheid. Inflation was brought under control, largely as a result of tighter monetary policies, and averaged less than 9% for the period 1993-1996. In 1996 inflation was 7.4%, the lowest rate since 1972. The only disappointing economic indicator since 1993 has been the trend in formal employment. Total employment in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy continued to decline between 1993 and 1996 despite the sustained growth in economy activity, thus constituting a situation of 'jobless growth'.
Despite the dramatic improvement in economic activity since 1993, the South African economy remains beset by a number of structural problems (e.g. shortage of skilled labour, low foreign exchange reserves), which are largely a function of the legacy of apartheid. In terms of income distribution, the country has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. The country has also experienced very high levels of crime and violence in the last few years.
Military Spending in South Africa
There have been wide variations in military spending in South Africa in the last 35 years, in absolute terms, as a share of GDP and as a share of total government expenditure (see Seegers,1987) .
Military spending began to increase again in the early 1970s as a result of growing external and internal opposition to apartheid. In 1973 large scale strikes in Durban constituted the first serious challenge to the South African government, and the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1974 was a tremendous psychological boost for South Africa's black population.
From the early 1970s the South African Defence Force (SADF) was deployed in Namibia in support of the South African Police against infiltrations by the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), and in 1975 South Africa became involved in the Angolan civil war in support of UNITA. In 1977/78 military spending peaked at 5% of GDP, and over 18% of total government expenditure. This was in response to the following developments: the 1976 Soweto uprising, the South African government's purchase of large amounts of weapons prior to the imposition of the mandatory UN arms embargo (1977) , and the government's implementation of "Total Strategy" to combat the "Total Onslaught" of communist expansionism in Southern Africa (see Cobbett,1989) .
Military spending then declined quite dramatically between 1977/78 and 1980/81, but then began to increase again during the 1980s as a result of South Africa's increasing involvement in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique, and the deteriorating internal security situation as a result of increasingly violent domestic opposition to apartheid. Military spending peaked again in 1989/90 at 4% of GDP and 13% of total government expenditure, and then declined quite dramatically after 1989.
In fact, between 1989/90 and 1996/97 South Africa's defence budget was cut by more than 50% in real terms, and declined by an average of more than 9% per annum between 1989/90 and 1996/97. Defence spending as a share of total government spending declined from nearly 13% to less than 6% and as a share of GDP from 4% to less than 2%. By 1996/97 military spending in South Africa was at the same level as it had been during the early 1970s (see table 2). -11.9 -19.6 -6.0 -13.4 8.6 -12.9 -10.3 -9.4 Defence/ GDP (%) The cuts in defence spending were achieved as a result of, and in conjunction with, a variety of disarmament measures including the rationalisation and restructuring of the South African military, including the disbanding of various SADF units and the closure and/or scaling down of various military bases and installations, the cancellation and postponement of major equipment projects, retrenchments of SADF personnel and Armscor personnel between 1989 and 1993, and the termination of the country's nuclear weapons programme.
Economic Growth and Military Spending
To investigate the relationship between growth and military spending in South Africa we use a simple neoclassical model based on an aggregate production function to provide the theoretical underpinnings for an empirical estimating equation. While this approach will limit us to a focus on the supply side effects of military spending on growth, it is valuable in providing a theoretical consistent starting point and a focus for determining important possible linkages between military spending and the real economy. The development of the neoclassical model is presented in Ram (1995) who also discusses recent applications.
Assuming the economy has two distinct sectors military (M) and non-military (C), into which labour L and capital K are the divisible inputs, and that the military sector has an externality effect on the rest of the economy.
Allowing input productivity to differ between the two sectors such that the ratios of the marginal productivities for the sectors are:
Military spending can then have two different effects on aggregate output and growth. It can have a higher or lower productivity differential δ, or a positive externality effect, on the rest of the economy (δC / δM > 0).
Rather than specify the sector inputs, for which there is either no data, or the data available is not what is required, the model is reformulated in terms of aggregate inputs. Taking the total derivative of Q and then substituting and manipulating gives:
The coefficient on the last term is the sum of the externality and factor productivity differential effects of military spending on growth and it would not be possible to distinguish the two effects by estimating this equation. Following Biswas and Ram (1986) and assuming that the externality parameter is not C M but C M (M/C) and is denoted θ allows us to write.
and separate estimates of θ and δ can be obtained.
The above equation can be operationalised by replacing the instantaneous rate of change of the variables with their discrete equivalents.
In addition to a number of studies that have developed this model for cross country analysis using cross section, or pooled time series and cross section, variations of this model have been used for a number of individual country studies including the US (Ward and Davis, 1992) , India (Ward et al, 1991) , and South Africa (McMillan, 1992) . Dunne (1996) provides a recent survey.
Estimating this equation for South Africa for the period 1964-95 gave the following results: These results suggest that economic growth in South Africa can be only partly explained by the model we have postulated, although the specification seems to be reasonable according to the different statistical tests. The R 2 suggests that the equation only explains 59% of the variation in the dependent variable, which in a time series regression is relatively poor. In addition, only the employment variable is statistically significant at 5% significance level. This variable is the growth in non-agricultural labour which is used to approximate the labour force. Surprisingly, the investment term is insignificant.
The military spending coefficient estimates suggest a positive externality effect, but a negative size effect, but these are only significant at 10%. Using these estimates we can derive the individual parameter values for externality effect and differential productivity effect as.
There are of course problems of multicollinearity with an equation of this form particularly between the two military spending terms. This will mean that although the estimates are unbiased they are imprecise and unstable. One would expect a high F statistic, but low individual significance which is what we observe. However, the joint test of zero restrictions on the military variables' coefficients cannot be rejected, suggesting that there is no significant impact of military spending on growth.
There are numerous ways in which this approach has been developed to take into account different aspects of the economy, through different forms of disaggregation. One study of particular interest is McMillan (1992) who estimates a variation of the model for South Africa 1950-85. This approach starts with the Ram (1986) model which assumes two sectors government (G) and non-government. Batchelor and Dunne (1996) present a model developed along those lines.
Another possibility is that the model we are using is not really picking up the dynamics of the relationship correctly. To investigate this an Autoregressive Ditributed Lag (ARDL) method can be used to allow the data to determine the short run dynamics. Using equation (2) as the starting point the results of this procedure, with up to a third order process allowed, are given in Table 4 . The results are reported only for the model with the growth in the capital stock. These results do seem to give a better specified model, but the conclusions are little different to the earlier results, with the military spending terms insignificant jointly. The long run solution is little different to the earlier results, in terms of sign and significance. The coefficients on the capital stock terms suggest that this term should be differenced again, but this does not alter the results 2 .
Another possible problem might be our application of the model to the economy as a whole. In South Africa it is not unreasonable to expect the impact of military spending on the economy to come through the manufacturing sector. The next section considers this.
Military Procurement and Manufacturing Growth
One of the major concerns of this form of analysis is the impact of military spending on the manufacturing, so it would seem reasonable to develop the model in a manner which deals with the analysis at this level. Rather than using output and expenditure at an aggregate level we focus on manufacturing output and military procurement expenditure. Manufacturing followed a similar pattern to the overall economy in the recession of 1989-93, with declines 9 in output and employment over 1990-3. It was also recovered more slowly, with positive growth in output only in 1994 and although employment grew slightly 1994-5 it declined by 3.7% in 1996. Over the period 1989-96 domestic arms procurement expenditure declined by nearly 8% but showed an erratic pattern. It reached 49% of total expenditure in 1993/4 before declining. In 1991/92 its share of manufacturing was 2.2%, but this had declined to 1.1% by 1996/7. -18.6 21.9 -19.5 5.6 -18.7 -8.4 -17.1 -7.8 Procurment/ Manufact(%) We can analyse the impact of this pattern of domestic procurement expenditure on manufacturing output by reinterpreting equation (2) above:
Y is now the manufacturing component of GDP (value added), L is manufacturing employment, M is domestic procurement expenditure and K is the manufacturing capital stock. We can replace I t /Y t-1 with ∆K t /K t-1 because we have estimates of the capital stock available for manufacturing sector.
Estimating this equation for South Africa for the period 1964-95 gave the following results: These results are rather disappointing, with only the growth of employment significant. The military expenditure terms are jointly significant in the second set of results. suggest some evidence of mispecification in the reset test for functional form, probably caused by outliers. The coefficient on ∆M t /M t-1 is poorly determined and makes the computation of the productivity differential questionable. However in both cases there is a positive externality effect but a negative productivity differential effect, suggesting a neagtive effect overall. Moving on to estimate the ARDL model gives results in Table 8 . As with the aggregate model this approach does seem to seem to give a better specified model and in this case provides some quite different results. The joint test for the military spending variables sows them to be significant and the long run coefficients suggest rather different results than the model in Table 7 . In addition to composite military spending term, the capital stock becomes significant, while the labour term becomes insignificant. The coefficients on the capital stock term again suggest it could be differenced but this will not effect the long run coefficients. There are no differences in sign. The estimated externality effect, from the long run coefficients is positive and the differential productivity effect negative as before, again suggesting an overall negative impact of military spending on the growth of manufacturing.
Conclusions
This paper has examined the economic effects of military spending in South Africa, using a neoclassical model common in the literature. When the analysis focussed upon the aggregate economy this suggested that military expenditure has not had a significant impact on economic growth. For the aggregate model there was a negative overall effect comprised of a negative differential productivity effect, but a positive externality effect, which was poorly determined. When the analysis shifted to the level of manufacturing industry, there was a clear significant effect, with the same patterns for the externality and differential effect though much better defined and clearly negative overall. The simple models where estimated in the usual fashion, but also an autoregressive distributed lag method was used to give the data the opportunity to better represent the dynamics. This did improve the specification of the model and provided more robust conclusions.
This suggests, therefore, that the cuts in defence spending since 1989 should have no significant impact on growth in the real economy. This result holds for both the economy as a whole and for the manufacturing sector. It is consistent with the results from other individual country studies using a neoclassical model. Given the importance of the development of the DIB to the maintenance of the apartheid system and the impact of the massive reductions in procurement expenditure since the start of the transition to democracy one might expect the impact of military spending to show more clearly on manufacturing.
The fact that the study used a supply-side econometric model does mean that the demand side impact of changes in military spending were not captured and the indirect impacts of the change are unlikely to be estimated fully. Nevertheless, it is the supply side which is usually the focus of research on conversion and the results of this paper provide some useful insights into the relation between military spending and economic growth in the South African economy.
